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Security bound of cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment (CSQBC) loosens the security requirement of quantum
bit commitment (QBC), so that the existing impossibility proofs of unconditionally secure QBC
can be evaded. But here we analyze the common features in all existing CSQBC protocols, and
show that in any CSQBC having these features, the receiver can always learn a non-trivial amount
of information on the sender’s committed bit before it is unveiled, while his cheating can pass the
security check with a probability not less than 50%. The sender’s cheating is also studied. The
optimal CSQBC protocols that can minimize the sum of the cheating probabilities of both parties
are found to be trivial, as they are practically useless. We also discuss the possibility of building a
fair protocol in which both parties can cheat with equal probabilities.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.-a, 03.67.Mn, 03.65.Ud
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is a two-party cryp-
tography including the following phases. In the commit
phase, Alice (the sender of the commitment) decides the
value of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit,
and sends Bob (the receiver of the commitment) a piece
of evidence, e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the un-
veil phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks
it with the evidence. The interval between the commit
and unveil phases is sometimes called the holding phase.
A QBC protocol is called unconditionally secure if any
cheating can be detected with a probability arbitrarily
close to 1. Here Alice’s cheating means that she wants
to change the value of b after the commit phase, while
Bob’s cheating means that he tries to learn b before the
unveil phase.
QBC is an essential primitive for building quantum
multi-party secure computations and other “post-cold-
war era” multi-party cryptographic protocols [1, 2]. Un-
fortunately, it is widely believed that unconditionally se-
cure QBC is impossible [3, 4]. This result, known as the
Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem, was considered
as putting a serious drawback on quantum cryptography.
To evade the problem, the concept “cheat sensitive
quantum bit commitment (CSQBC)” was proposed [5–
10], where the probability for detecting the cheating does
not need to be arbitrarily close to 1. Instead, it merely
requires the probability to be nonzero. With this loosen
security requirement, many insecure QBC protocols can
be regarded as secure CSQBC. Therefore, at the first
glance it seems that CSQBC will be very easy to achieve.
But intriguingly, here we will show that there still
exists boundary for the security of a typical class of
CSQBC. Especially, Bob can always feel free to measure
the quantum states to learn b, while he stands at least
50% chances to escape Alice’s detection.
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Result
Common features of CSQBC
By checking the existing CSQBC protocols [5–10], we
find that they all share the following common features
(note that the names Alice and Bob are used reversely in
[7, 9, 10]):
(1) During the holding phase, the receiver Bob owns
a quantum system Ψ encoding Alice’s committed bit b.
(Ψ can either be prepared by the sender Alice, or be
prepared by Bob and sent to Alice, who returns it to
Bob after performing some certain operations according
to her choice of b. It also does not matter whether Alice
prepared and kept another quantum system entangling
with Ψ.)
(2) Bob knows the definitions of ρB0 and ρ
B
1 directly
before the end of the commit phase. (That is, these def-
initions are either clearly stated by the protocol, or an-
nounced to Bob by Alice classically. Bob does not need
to perform operations on any quantum system to gain
knowledge of these definitions.) Here ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are the
density matrices of Bob’s Ψ corresponding to b = 0 and
b = 1, respectively.
(3) To detect Bob’s cheating, at the unveil phase Alice
can check whether the state of Ψ is intact. (It does not
matter whether the entire Ψ or only a small part can be
checked.)
(4) To detect Alice’s cheating, at the unveil phase Bob
can learn a nontrivial amount of information on the value
of b from Ψ, even without any help from Alice.
The last feature indicates that there exists at least
one operation known to Bob, which can output a bit b′
when being applied on Ψ, and b′ = b should occur with
a probability larger than 1/2. As a result, there must
be ρB0 6= ρB1 . This is a main difference from the original
QBC, where there is generally ρB0 ≃ ρB1 so that it can be
unconditionally secure against dishonest-Bob.
The original purpose of CSQBC having these features
is as follows. Alice’s cheating strategy suggested in the
MLC no-go theorem is based on the Hughston-Jozsa-
2Wootters (HJW) theorem [11], which applies to the case
ρB0 ≃ ρB1 . Therefore with feature (4), i.e., ρB0 6= ρB1 , Al-
ice’s cheating becomes detectable so that the MLC no-go
theorem can be evaded. On the other hand, if Bob takes
advantages of ρB0 6= ρB1 and performs measurements to
discriminate the committed bit b, the quantum state will
be disturbed. In this case, with feature (3) Bob’s cheat-
ing will be detected with a certain probability when Alice
asks him to return the quantum state and checks wether
it remains undisturbed, so that the goal of CSQBC can
be met.
But with a rigorous quantitative analysis on the prob-
ability of detecting Bob’s cheating, we will find that it
is always not sufficiently large when Bob applies some
specific measurements. Therefore any CSQBC protocol
having the above four features will be bounded by the
security limit below.
Notations and Bob’s cheating strategy
According to Eq. (9.22) of [12], the trace distance
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) ≡ tr
∣∣ρB0 − ρB1 ∣∣ /2 (where |A| ≡ √A†A) be-
tween ρB0 and ρ
B
1 satisfies
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = max
P
tr(P (ρB0 − ρB1 )), (1)
where the maximization is taken over all positive oper-
ators P ≤ I, with I being the identity operator. The
above feature (2) of CSQBC guarantees that Bob knows
how ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are defined. Thus he can find the positive
projectors P = Pm that maximizes tr(P (ρ
B
0 − ρB1 )). If
ρB0 stands a higher probability to be projected success-
fully than ρB1 when applying Pm, then we takes P0 ≡ Pm
and P1 ≡ I − Pm. Otherwise we takes P0 ≡ I − Pm
and P1 ≡ Pm. Feature (1) ensures that Bob owns
the system Ψ encoding Alice’s committed bit b during
the holding phase. Therefore, by applying the positive
operator-valued measure (POVM) {P †0P0, P †1P1} on Ψ,
Bob can discriminate between ρB0 and ρ
B
1 and learn Al-
ice’s committed b with the maximal probability allowed
by D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ).
To analyze rigorously the probability for Bob to es-
cape Alice’s detection with this POVM, let H be the
global Hilbert space constructed by all possible states of
Ψ (either b = 0 or 1). Since P0, P1 are positive projec-
tors, there exists an orthonormal basis {|ei〉} of H (the
following proof remains valid regardless whether {|ei〉} is
known to Alice or Bob), in which P0, P1 can be expressed
as
P0 =
∑
i
∣∣∣e(0)i
〉〈
e
(0)
i
∣∣∣ ,
P1 =
∑
i
∣∣∣e(1)i
〉〈
e
(1)
i
∣∣∣ , (2)
where {
∣∣∣e(0)i
〉
} ∪ {
∣∣∣e(1)i
〉
} = {|ei〉}.
Meanwhile, before Bob applying any measurement, the
general form of the initial state of Ψ can always be writ-
ten as
|Φ⊗Ψ〉ini =
√
α
∑
i
λ
(0)
i
∣∣∣f (0)i
〉
⊗
∣∣∣e(0)i
〉
+
√
β
∑
i
λ
(1)
i
∣∣∣f (1)i
〉
⊗
∣∣∣e(1)i
〉
, (3)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, β = 1−α, and∑
i
∣∣∣λ(0)i
∣∣∣2 =∑
i
∣∣∣λ(1)i
∣∣∣2 =
1 (sum over all possible i within each corresponding sub-
space). The values of α, β, λ
(0)
i ’s and λ
(1)
i ’s are chosen
by Alice according to the value of her committed bit b.
Here Φ is a quantum system that Alice may introduce
and keep to herself, which entangles with Bob’s Ψ. All∣∣∣f (0)i
〉
’s and
∣∣∣f (1)i
〉
’s are the vectors describing the state
of Φ, which are not required to be orthogonal to each
other. In the case where Alice does not introduce such a
system, we can simply set all
∣∣∣f (0)i
〉
’s and
∣∣∣f (1)i
〉
’s to be
equal, so that Eq. (3) still applies.
The security bound on Bob’s cheating
As elaborated in the 1st subsection of Methods sec-
tion, when dishonest-Bob applies the above POVM
{P †0P0, P †1P1} on Ψ, we find that the probability for Bob’s
cheating to pass Alice’s detection successfully is
PB =
1
2
+
1
2
(2α− 1)2, (4)
and the amount of mutual information he obtained is
Im = 1− h(α). (5)
Here h(α) ≡ −α log2 α− (1−α) log2(1−α) is the binary
entropy function.
With Eqs. (4) and (5), we plot PB and Im as a function
of α in FIG. 1. Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, FIG. 1 and Eq. (4)
both gives
PB ≥ 50%. (6)
The minimum PB = 50% can be reached when Alice
chooses α = 0.5. Thus we come to the conclusion that
Bob can always learn Alice’s committed b with the maxi-
mal probability allowed by the trace distance between ρB0
and ρB1 , while his cheating stands at least 50% chance to
escape Alice’s detection.
It may look weird that FIG. 1 seems to indicate that
the more amount of information that Bob obtains, the
easier he can pass Alice’s detection. But we must note
that the amount of Bob’s information is not chosen by
himself. Instead, it is determined by the value of α that
Alice chooses. That is, once Alice determines which state
is used for encoding her committed bit, the maximum
amount of information that Bob can obtain is also fixed.
3FIG. 1: Bob’s successful cheating probability PB (red line)
and mutual information Im (blue line) on Alice’s committed
bit b as a function of α that Alice chooses for the initial state
Eq. (3). The dash lines mark the values for the protocol in
Ref. [5].
On the other hand, the above result indicates that Al-
ice should make α as close to 0.5 as possible, so that Bob’s
information and successful cheating probability can be
minimized. However, note that she has to choose the
initial state Eq. (3) within the range restricted by the
protocol. Due to the feature (4) of CSQBC, the trace
distance D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) has to be nonzero, Therefore, gener-
ally α cannot be made very close to 0.5, as we will see in
the examples below.
Examples
In the CSQBC protocol in [5], Bob’s system Ψ is a
single qubit, whose state is either |0〉 or |−〉 (|1〉 or |+〉)
when Alice commits b = 0 (b = 1). Here |0〉 and |1〉
are orthogonal to each other, |±〉 ≡ (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. So
we have ρB0 = (|0〉 〈0|+ |−〉 〈−|)/2 and ρB1 = (|1〉 〈1|+
|+〉 〈+|)/2. Define
∣∣∣e(0)〉 ≡ cos(−pi/8) |0〉+ sin(−pi/8) |1〉 ,∣∣∣e(1)〉 ≡ cos(3pi/8) |0〉+ sin(3pi/8) |1〉 . (7)
Then Bob’s operation for maximally discriminating ρB0
and ρB1 is to measure Ψ in the basis {
∣∣e(0)〉 , ∣∣e(1)〉}, i.e.,
he applies the projector P0 =
∣∣e(0)〉 〈e(0)∣∣. When the
projection is successful (unsuccessful), he takes b′ = 0
(b′ = 1) as the decoded result. With this method, b′ will
match Alice’s actual committed bit b with the probabil-
ity cos2(pi/8) ≃ 85.36%. Meanwhile, Alice’s four input
states can be expanded in the {
∣∣e(0)〉 , ∣∣e(1)〉} basis as
|0〉 = cos(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(0)〉+ sin(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(1)〉 ,
|−〉 = cos(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(0)〉− sin(pi/8) ∣∣∣e(1)〉 ,
|1〉 = − sin(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(0)〉+ cos(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(1)〉 ,
|+〉 = sin(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(0)〉+ cos(pi/8)
∣∣∣e(1)〉 . (8)
Comparing with Eq. (3), we can see that there is either
α = cos2(pi/8) or α = sin2(pi/8). Substitute them into
Eq. (4) will both yield PB = sin
4(pi/8) + cos4(pi/8) =
75%. That is, in the CSQBC protocol in [5], Bob can
learn Alice’s committed bit with reliability 85.36% (i.e.,
his mutual information is 1− h(0.8536) ≃ 0.4 bit) before
the unveil phase, while he can pass Alice’s security check
with probability 75%. This protocol is corresponding to
the dash lines in our FIG. 1.
Another example can be found in [13], where we illus-
trated how our above cheating strategy applies on the
CSQBC protocol in [9]. This protocol looks more com-
plicated than the one in [5], as the committed bit b is
encoded with many qubits, instead of a single one. The
authors of [9] merely analyzed the individual attack of
the receiver (note that they used the names Alice and
Bob reversely) where the qubits are measured one by one.
Then it is concluded that the cheating can be detected
with a probability arbitrarily close to 1. But as we shown
above, instead of individual measurements, the dishonest
receiver can apply a two-element POVM {P †0P0, P †1P1}
on the entire state encoding the committed bit. When
this state consists of many qubits, each basis vector |ei〉
of the Hilbert space H is a multi-level state describing
all qubits. Thus the projectors P0, P1 in Eq. (2) are
actually collective measurements. The detailed form of
P0, P1 is given in Eq. (2) of [13]. As a result, it was fur-
ther elaborated there that this collective measurement is
as effective as individual measurements on learning the
committed bit, while it causes much less disturbance on
the multi-qubit state. Once again, the probability for the
cheater to escape the detection was shown [13] to be not
less than 50%. With the increase of the qubit number n,
this probability can even be arbitrarily close to 100%.
Alice’s cheating strategy
Alice’s cheating strategy used in the MLC no-go the-
orem requires the condition ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , which no longer
holds in CSQBC. Nevertheless, she can still apply the
same strategy in CSQBC and try her luck. To give a
detailed description of the strategy, first let us model the
coding method in CSQBC more precisely. For general-
ity, consider that in the protocol, besides Bob’s system
Ψ, there is another system E. Alice’s different commit-
ted values of b is encoded with different states of the
combined system E⊗Ψ. System E is kept at Alice’s side
4during the commit and holding phases, and is required to
be sent to Bob at the unveil phase to justify Alice’s com-
mitment. Let ρEB0 and ρ
EB
1 denote the density matrices
of E ⊗Ψ corresponding to b = 0 and b = 1, respectively.
Note that in all existing CSQBC protocols [5–10], there
is no such a system E. But we include it here, so that the
model can cover more protocols that may be proposed in
the future.
In this scenario, Alice’s cheating strategy is as follows.
At the beginning of the protocol she introduces an ancil-
lary system Φ which is a copy of E⊗Ψ. Since the fidelity
F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) ≡ tr
√
(ρEB0 )
1/2ρEB1 (ρ
EB
0 )
1/2 between ρEB0
and ρEB1 satisfies [12]
F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) = max
|ψ0〉,|ψ1〉
|〈ψ0 |ψ1〉| , (9)
where the maximization is over all purifications |ϕ0〉 of
ρEB0 and |ϕ1〉 of ρEB1 into Φ⊗E⊗Ψ, Alice finds the real
and positive |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉 that reach the maximum, i.e.,
F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) = 〈ψ0 |ψ1〉 = 〈ψ1 |ψ0〉 . (10)
Then she prepares the initial state of Φ⊗ E ⊗Ψ as
|ψc〉 = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉
N
, (11)
where the normalization constant
N =
√
2 + 〈ψ0 |ψ1〉+ 〈ψ1 |ψ0〉. (12)
She uses this state to complete the rest of the commit
protocol. With this method, the value of b is not deter-
mined during the commit phase.
In the unveil phase, Alice decides whether she wants
to unveil b = 0 or b = 1. Then she simply uses |ψc〉 as
|ψb〉 to complete the protocol. From the symmetry of
|ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 in Eq.(11), we can see that her successful
cheating probabilities for b = 0 and b = 1 are both
PA = |〈ψ0 |ψc〉|2 = (1 + 〈ψ0 |ψ1〉)(1 + 〈ψ1 |ψ0〉)
2 + 〈ψ0 |ψ1〉+ 〈ψ1 |ψ0〉
=
1 + F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 )
2
. (13)
Therefore, in any specific CSQBC protocol, the Alice’s
exact cheating probability can be calculated once the def-
inition of ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 is known.
The optimal protocols are trivial
Now we will try to find the CSQBC protocols which
can optimally detect the cheating of both parties, i.e.,
minimizing the sum of Alice’s and Bob’s cheating prob-
abilities.
Note that Eq. (4) depends on the specific value of α in
the state Eq. (3) that Alice chooses in a single run of the
protocol, while F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) in Eq. (13) is the statistical
result of all the legitimate states allowed by the protocol.
Thus it is hard to compare Eq. (13) and Eq. (4) directly
and give a general result without knowing the details on
the composition of ρEBb in a specific protocol.
Fortunately, in all existing CSQBC protocols [5–10],
there is no system E. The form of the states of Bob’s
system Ψ alone carries all the information of b. Thus
the trace distance D(ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) = D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ). For any
protocol of this kind (as well as protocols having sys-
tem E but still satisfying D(ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) = D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 )),
we can replace both α and F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) with D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ),
as elaborated in the 2nd subsection of Method, where we
obtain
PA ≥ 1− D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
, (14)
and
PB ≥ 1 +D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
2
. (15)
These two equations suggest that PA and PB cannot be
minimized simultaneously in the same protocol, because
reducing PA requires a higher D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ), while it will
result in a higher PB at the same time.
Moreover, we must note that the above PA and PB are
obtained assuming that the actions of both parties in the
protocol will always be checked. But this is impossible,
because they share the same system Φ⊗E⊗Ψ. In the un-
veil phase, either Bob will measure E⊗Ψ to check Alice’s
action, or he is required to return Ψ to Alice who checks
his action. These cannot be done simultaneously. Sup-
pose that in a CSQBC protocol, Bob’s action is checked
with probability ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1), and Alice’s action is
checked with probability 1− ζ. When one’s action is not
checked, he/she can cheat successfully with probability
1. Thus the cheating probabilities PA and PB should be
replaced by
P ∗A = ζ + (1 − ζ)PA (16)
and
P ∗B = (1− ζ) + ζPB , (17)
respectively. Combining them with Eqs. (14) and (15),
we find
P ∗A + P
∗
B ≥ 2−
ζ +D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
+ζD(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 )
1 +D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
. (18)
Since 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ D(ρB0 , ρB1 ) ≤ 1, we find another
security lower bound of CSQBC
P ∗A + P
∗
B ≥
3
2
. (19)
5FIG. 2: The lower bound of the sum of the cheating probabili-
ties P ∗A+P
∗
B as a function of the trace distance D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ) and
the probability ζ with which Bob’s action is checked. A and
B denote the points that reach the minimum P ∗A+P
∗
B = 3/2.
To find the optimal protocol that can reach this bound,
we plot the lower bound of P ∗A + P
∗
B as a function of
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) and ζ in FIG. 2 according to Eq. (18). It
shows that there are two types of protocols that can both
reach the minimum P ∗A+P
∗
B = 3/2, denoted as points A
and B in FIG. 2, respectively, with the parameters (A)
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1, ζ = 0, and (B) D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 0, ζ = 1.
Type (A) protocols mean that ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are orthogo-
nal so that P ∗A reaches its minimum 1/2. However, ρ
B
0
and ρB1 can be distinguished perfectly and Bob’s action is
never checked. Thus P ∗B = 1, i.e., he can always learn Al-
ice’s committed b with reliability 1 and never get caught.
In type (B) protocols, ρB0 = ρ
B
1 so that Bob learns noth-
ing about b. But Alice’s action is never checked so that
she can unveil b as whatever she wants, with a successful
cheating probability P ∗A = 1. Therefore, we can see that
these optimal protocols are all trivial as they are com-
pletely insecure against one of the parties. Thus they do
not seem to have any practical usage.
The fair protocol
Since the protocols that can minimize P ∗A+P
∗
B all look
useless, let us consider the protocol satisfying P ∗A = P
∗
B
so that it is fair for both parties, and try to minimize
P ∗A, P
∗
B in this case. From Eq. (37) we can see that the
inequality Eq. (15) can become equality when α¯2 = α2,
i.e., all the states allowed to be chosen in the protocol
for committing the same b value should have the same
α value. Also, note that the lowest bounds in Eqs. (14)
and (18) cannot be reached by most D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ), because
these inequalities can become equalities if and only if
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1 − D(ρB0 , ρB1 ), which requires ρB0 = ρB1 .
Therefore, only the above optimal protocols can reach
these bound. For this reason, to calculate P ∗A precisely
in other protocols, we should use Eq. (13) instead of Eq.
(14). To compute F (ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) in Eq. (13), for simplicity
we consider only the protocols in which there are
ρEB0 = ρ
B
0 =
[
α 0
0 1− α
]
,
ρEB1 = ρ
B
1 =
[
1− α 0
0 α
]
, (20)
then
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 2
√
α(1 − α),
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 2α− 1. (21)
Combining them with Eqs. (13), (16), (17) and (15) (the
latter becomes equality once we choose α¯2 = α2), then
by solving P ∗A = P
∗
B we yield
ζ =
2
√
α(1− α)− 1
(2α− 1)2 + 2
√
α(1 − α)− 2 . (22)
Any protocol satisfying this equation is fair for both par-
ties. Now let us find the minimal value of P ∗A = P
∗
B.
Substituting this ζ into Eq. (17), we obtain
P ∗A = P
∗
B =
(2
√
α(1 − α) + 1)(2α2 − 2α+ 1)− 2
4α2 − 4α+ 2
√
α(1− α)− 1 . (23)
By solving dP ∗A/dα = 0, we find that the minimal cheat-
ing probabilities in such protocols are P ∗A = P
∗
B = 0.904,
which can be obtained when α ≃ 0.885, i.e., √α ≃
0.941 ≃ cos(19.85◦). In this case ζ ≃ 0.469.
A simple protocol having these parameters is: Al-
ice sends Bob the state cos(19.85◦) |0〉 ± sin(19.85◦) |1〉
(sin(19.85◦) |0〉 ± cos(19.85◦) |1〉) if she wants to commit
b = 0 (b = 1). In the unveil phase, with probability
ζ ≃ 0.469 Bob returns the state and Alice checks whether
it remains undisturbed, with probability 1 − ζ ≃ 0.531
Bob measures the state and checks whether it agrees with
the value of Alice unveiled b.
Nevertheless, there is the difficulty in finding a method
for deciding which party will be checked in a single run
of the protocol. Dishonest Alice (Bob) would like to de-
crease 1 − ζ (ζ) so that P ∗A (P ∗B) can be raised. Thus
they do not trust each other and may not collaborate.
The CSQBC protocol in [5] adopts a process called “the
game” to handle this problem, which is very similar to
quantum coin flipping (QCF) protocols [14]. However,
Ishizaka [15] showed that this process provides extra se-
curity loophole to Bob, so that there is a cheating strat-
egy for him to learn b with reliability 61.79% (which is
lower than what can be obtained with our cheating strat-
egy, as calculated in the Examples section) while passing
Alice’s check with probability 100% (which is higher than
that of our strategy). It was further shown in [16] that
due to the inexistence of ideal black-boxed QCF, any
CSQBC protocol based on biased QCF cannot be secure.
Therefore, it remains unclear how to build a fair CSQBC
protocol with P ∗A = P
∗
B while minimizing P
∗
A and P
∗
B.
6Discussion
In summary, we showed that any CSQBC protocol hav-
ing the above four features is subjected to the security
bound Eq. (6). Protocols satisfying D(ρEB0 , ρ
EB
1 ) =
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) is further bounded by Eq. (19). Note that the
insecurity of QCF-based CSQBC protocols (e.g., [5, 6])
was already pinpointed out in [15, 16]. But our proof
also applies to the non-QCF-based ones.
Our result should not be simply considered as a gen-
eralization of the MLC no-go proof. Instead, it is a com-
plement. This is because the MLC no-go proof applies
to QBC protocol with ρB0 ≃ ρB1 . But as pointed out in
[9], CSQBC does not need to satisfy this requirement so
that it may evade the MLC theorem. On the contrary,
our proof works for the case ρB0 6= ρB1 , thus it fills the gap
where the MLC proof left. Meanwhile, the MLC theorem
concentrates on the cheating of Alice. It does not exclude
the existence of protocols which is unconditionally secure
against dishonest Bob only. On the other hand, our result
shows that Bob can always cheat in CSQBC regardless
Alice is honest or not.
It will be interesting to study whether there can be
CSQBC protocols without the above four features. It
seems that Kent’s relativistic QBC [17–19] and our re-
cent proposals [20, 21] do not satisfy feature (1), while
the protocol in [22] does not have feature (2), as elabo-
rated in [23]. However, these works are aimed to achieve
the original QBC, instead of CSQBC. Also, [20–23] have
not gained wide recognition yet. Thus it is still an open
question whether it is possible to build non-relativistic
CSQBC protocols which are not limited by the above
security bounds, without relying on computational and
experimental constraints.
Methods
Calculating Bob’s cheating probability
Consider the POVM {P †0P0, P †1P1} defined in Eq. (2).
After Bob applies it on Ψ, there can be two outcomes.
(I) The projection outcome is P0. Then Bob takes
b′ = 0 as his decoded result of Alice’s committed bit b.
With Eqs. (2) and (3) we yield
P0 |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini =
√
α
∑
i
λ
(0)
i
∣∣∣f (0)i
〉
⊗
∣∣∣e(0)i
〉
. (24)
Thus this case will occurs with the probability
pI = α, (25)
while the resultant state of Φ⊗Ψ is
|Φ⊗Ψ〉I =
1√
pI
P0 |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini . (26)
As described in feature (3) of CSQBC, at the unveil
phase Alice may require Bob to return Ψ and check
whether it remains intact in its initial state. The maxi-
mal probability for Alice to find out that Bob has already
projected |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini into |Φ⊗Ψ〉I is bounded by
p˜I = 1− |I 〈Φ⊗Ψ |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini|2
= 1− 1
pI
α2. (27)
Thus the total probability for (case (I) occurred) AND
(Alice failed to detect Bob’s cheating) is
pI(1− p˜I) = α2. (28)
(II) The projection outcome is P1. Then Bob takes
b′ = 1 as his decoded result of Alice’s b. Now
P1 |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini =
√
β
∑
i
λ
(1)
i
∣∣∣f (1)i
〉
⊗
∣∣∣e(1)i
〉
. (29)
Obviously, this case will occurs with the probability
pII = 1− pI . (30)
Meanwhile, the resultant state of Φ⊗Ψ in this case is
|Φ⊗Ψ〉II =
1√
pII
P1 |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini . (31)
The maximal probability for Alice to find out that
Bob has already projected |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini into |Φ⊗Ψ〉II is
bounded by
p˜II = 1− |II 〈Φ⊗Ψ |Φ⊗Ψ〉ini|2
= 1− 1
pII
β2. (32)
Thus the total probability for (case (II) occurred) AND
(Alice failed to detect Bob’s cheating) is
pII(1− p˜II) = β2. (33)
Taking both cases (I) and (II) into consideration, the
overall probability for Bob’s cheating to pass Alice’s de-
tection successfully is
PB = pI(1 − p˜I) + pII(1− p˜II) = α2 + β2
=
1
2
+
1
2
(2α− 1)2. (34)
Meanwhile, since the projection outcome will either
be P0 or P1 with the probabilities pI and pII = 1 −
pI , respectively, Bob’s b
′ will match Alice’s b with the
probability pI or 1−pI too. Note that h(1−pI) = h(pI).
Thus the amount of mutual information that Bob obtains
with this POVM is
Im = 1− h(pI) = 1− h(α). (35)
7Bounding the cheating probabilities with trace
distance
Suppose that there are many states allowed to be cho-
sen randomly for committing b = 0 in the protocol, each
of which takes the form of Eq. (3), but with different val-
ues of the coefficients α, β, λ
(0)
i ’s and λ
(1)
i ’s. Bob applies
the optimal POVM to decode b. Then Eq. (3) indicates
that he can learn b correctly with probability α¯, i.e., the
average of α. Meanwhile, it is well-known that the max-
imal probability for discriminating two density matrices
ρB0 , ρ
B
1 is (1 +D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 ))/2. Therefore
D(ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 2α¯− 1. (36)
Since Eq. (4) shows that Bob’s average cheating proba-
bility for these states is
PB =
1 + (2α− 1)2
2
≥ 1 + (2α¯− 1)
2
2
, (37)
we have
PB ≥ 1 +D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
2
. (38)
Similar discussion is also valid for the states for commit-
ting b = 1, except that α should be replace by β = 1−α.
But Eq. (38) remains the same because Eq. (4) satisfies
PB(1− α) = PB(α).
On the other hand, since [12]
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) ≥ 1−D(ρB0 , ρB1 ), (39)
from Eq. (13) we yield
PA ≥ 1− D(ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
1 )
2
. (40)
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